| Vorliegende Sprache |
eng |
| ISBN |
978-0-19-774363-8 |
| Name |
Talbot, Brian ¬[VerfasserIn]¬ |
| T I T E L |
¬The¬ end of epistemology as we know it |
| Verlagsort |
New York, NY |
| Verlag |
Oxford University Press |
| Erscheinungsjahr |
2024 |
| 2024 |
| Umfang |
1 online resource. |
| Reihe |
Oxford scholarship online |
| Notiz / Fußnoten |
Also issued in print: 2024. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on November 1, 2023) |
| Titelhinweis |
Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe)ISBN: 978-0-19-774363-8 |
| ISBN |
ISBN 978-0-19-774366-9 ebook |
| Klassifikation |
121 |
| 121 |
| BD161 |
| Kurzbeschreibung |
Epistemology is the philosophical study of how we should form our beliefs. It is one of the central areas of philosophical inquiry and has been so for as long as there have been philosophers. 'The End of Epistemology As We Know It' challenges the views and methodology of almost every epistemologist, both historical and contemporary. In a call for radical reform of how epistemology is practiced and a rethinking of conventional wisdom in this area, Brian Talbot puts forward new epistemic norms that differ significantly from the norms of mainstream epistemic theories. |
| 2. Kurzbeschreibung |
"The epistemic norms should matter. The ones philosophers typically focus on do not matter enough. So we should replace them. While the replacement norms will agree to some significant extent with more standard epistemic norms, they will vary quite significantly as well. They will permit us to form some seemingly bad beliefs - beliefs that violate all standard norms by going against our evidence, being incoherent, or even being clearly false - in order to improve other beliefs. In fact, they will sometimes allow our beliefs to be bad for no reason whatsoever. That paragraph summarizes the project of this book. What does it mean? First, what are epistemic norms? Answering this is complicated by the fact that there is no uncontroversial characterization of the epistemic and by my goal to engage with a wide variety of views. For that reason, I'll sketch the extension of what I am talking about rather than try to give a definition that all epistemic norms fit. This is only a sketch; anything that looks enough like the examples I'm giving here is probably an epistemic norm as well. Perhaps the most traditional characterization of epistemology is as the study of knowledge. I don't think that's how we should think about it, as you'll eventually see, but it's a good place to start. Knowledge is one possible epistemic norm - we might think that our beliefs should be knowledge, or that knowledge is that standard against which we should measure our beliefs. Knowing that p traditionally requires that one's belief that p be justified. The standards for justification are also epistemic norms. Sometimes philosophers talk about beliefs being warranted rather than justified, or about beliefs being rational, or theoretically rational (to differentiate these norms from those of practical rationality). These are also epistemic norms. Epistemic norms may have to do with the pursuit of truth, or accuracy, or knowledge, or wisdom, or understanding. Epistemic norms may say that our beliefs should fit the evidence, be coherent with one another, or be reliably formed. The epistemic norms can be norms on full, all-or-nothing belief, but they can also be norms on degrees of belief or credences: the norms discussed in the literature on Bayesian rationality - norms of probabilism and conditionalization, for example - are epistemic norms"-- |
| SWB-Titel-Idn |
1878774174 |
| Signatur |
E-Book Oxford EBS |
| Bemerkungen |
Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
| Elektronische Adresse |
$uhttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197743638.001.0001 |
| Internetseite / Link |
Resolving-System |
