| Vorliegende Sprache |
eng |
| Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben |
1690995874 Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe): ‡Azzouni, Jody, 1954 - : Attributing knowledge |
| ISBN |
978-0-19-750881-7 |
| Name |
Azzouni, Jody ¬[VerfasserIn]¬ |
| T I T E L |
Attributing knowledge |
| Zusatz zum Titel |
what it means to know something |
| Verlagsort |
New York, NY |
| Verlag |
Oxford University Press |
| Erscheinungsjahr |
2020 |
| 2020 |
| Umfang |
1 online resource. |
| Reihe |
Oxford scholarship online |
| Notiz / Fußnoten |
Also issued in print: 2020. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on September 15, 2020) |
| Titelhinweis |
Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe)ISBN: 978-0-19-750881-7 |
| Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe): ‡Azzouni, Jody, 1954 - : Attributing knowledge |
| ISBN |
ISBN 978-0-19-750884-8 ebook |
| Klassifikation |
121 |
| BD161 |
| CC 4400 |
| Kurzbeschreibung |
In this text, Jody Azzouni challenges existing epistemological conventions about knowledge: what it means to know something, who or what is seen as knowing, and how we talk about it. He argues that the classic restrictive conditions philosophers routinely place on knowers only hold in special cases, and suggests that knowledge can be equally attributed to children, sophisticated animals (great apes, orcas), unsophisticated animals (bees), and machinery or devices (driverless cars). Through this perspective and a close examination of its relation to linguistics and psychology, Azzouni freshly approaches longstanding epistemological puzzles including the dogmatism paradox, Gettier puzzles, Agrippa's trilemma, and the surprise-exam paradox. |
| 2. Kurzbeschreibung |
"The word "know" is revealed as vague, applicable to fallible agents, factive and criterion transcendent. It is invariant in its meaning across contexts and invariant relative to different agents. Only purely epistemic properties affect its correct application-not the interests of agents or those who attribute the word to agents. These properties enable "know" to be applied correctly-as it routinely is-to cognitive agents ranging from sophisticated human knowers, who engage in substantial metacognition, to various animals, who know much less and do much less, if any, metacognition, to nonconscious mechanical devices such as drones, robots, and the like. These properties of the word "know" suffice to explain the usage phenomena that contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists invoke to place pressure on an understanding of the word that treats its application as involving no interests of agents, or others. It is also shown the factivity and the fallibilist-compatibility of the word "know" explains Moorean paradoxes, the preface paradox, and the lottery paradox. A fallibility-sensitive failure of knowledge-closure is given along with a similar failure of rational-belief closure. The latter explains why rational agents can nevertheless believe A and B, where A and B contradict one another. A substantial discussion of various kinds of metacognition is given-as well as a discussion of the metacognition literature in cognitive ethology. An appendix offers a new resolution of the hangman paradox, one that turns neither on a failure of knowledge closure nor on a failure of KK"-- |
| 1. Schlagwortkette |
Erkenntnistheorie |
| Fallibilismus |
| ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Erkenntnistheorie -- Fallibilismus |
| SWB-Titel-Idn |
1738692272 |
| Signatur |
E-Book Oxford EBS |
| Bemerkungen |
Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
| Elektronische Adresse |
$uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508817.001.0001 |
| Internetseite / Link |
Resolving-System |
