| Vorliegende Sprache |
eng |
| Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben |
37863898X Druckausg.: ‡Scherf, Gundbert: Financial stability policy in the euro zone |
| ISBN |
978-3-658-00982-3 |
| Name |
Scherf, Gundbert |
| T I T E L |
Financial Stability Policy in the Euro Zone |
| Zusatz zum Titel |
The Political Economy of National Banking Regulation in an Integrating Monetary Union |
| Verlagsort |
Wiesbaden |
| Verlag |
Springer Gabler |
| Erscheinungsjahr |
2014 |
| 2014 |
| Umfang |
Online-Ressource (XX, 256 p. 39 illus, digital) |
| Reihe |
SpringerLink. Bücher |
| Notiz / Fußnoten |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Weiterer Inhalt |
Foreword; Preface; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Abbreviations; Prelude The financial crisis as a crisis of regulated capitalism; Policy choices and regulation as root causes of the financial crisis; The de-regulated banking system as an accelerated contagion mechanism; Globalization of de-regulation and spread to European banking; Conclusion: The financial crisis 2007-9 as a crisis of regulated capitalism; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Introduction of the research topic; 1.1.1 Financial stability: Why does it matter?; 1.1.2 The regulation of financial stability. 1.2 Research questions1.3 Status of the literature and the 'gap' to be filled; 1.3.1 The political economy approach to economic policy research; 1.3.2 State of the art of the political science literature; 1.3.3 State of the art of the economics literature; 1.3.4 Conclusion: The need for an integrated political economy theory of banking regulation; 1.4 Research design; 1.4.1 Theoretical framework; 1.4.2 Research variables; 1.5 The main argument; 2 Trading off financial stability: A political economy perspective on European banking regulation; 2.1 Financial stability. 2.1.1 Financial stability defined2.1.2 Financial stability as a policy field; 2.1.3 Conclusion; 2.2 Regulatory policy objectives; 2.2.1 The public interest view: The regulator as delegated monitor for financial stability; 2.2.2 The private interest view: The regulator as captured agent for credit and competitiveness; 2.2.3 National regulatory mandates; 2.3 Financial stability governance in the Euro Zone; 2.3.1 The European Central Bank's limited role in financial stability; 2.3.2 National regulators' strong role in financial stability policy. 2.3.3 Comitology between the ECB and national regulators2.4 Financial stability instruments; 2.4.1 Monetary policy; 2.4.2 Banking regulation and supervision; 2.4.3 Macro-prudential regulation and supervision; 2.4.4 Political economy implications; 2.5 The regulatory ‚trilemma'; 3 What drives the banking regulator? Varieties of financial systems and regulatory preferences; 3.1 Regulatory preferences across financial systems; 3.2 The varying organization and accountability of national regulators; 3.2.1 Organizational design of the regulator. 3.2.2 Political accountability/ independence of the regulator3.2.3 Conclusion; 3.3 Financial systems and the varying role of banks across countries; 3.3.1 Financial systems: Varying financial stability configurations across countries; 3.1.2 Legal institutions: The varying strength of depositors, creditors, and investors across countries; 3.1.3 Conclusion; 3.4. Empirical clustering analysis; 3.4.1 Financial system clusters; 3.4.2 Legal institution clusters; 3.4.3 Joint cluster of financial systems and legal institutions; 3.4.4 Conclusion and evaluation of findings against hypotheses. 3.5 Regulating along a trilemma: Three stylized regimes |
| Titelhinweis |
Druckausg.: ‡Scherf, Gundbert: Financial stability policy in the euro zone |
| ISBN |
ISBN 978-3-658-00983-0 |
| Klassifikation |
BUS069000 |
| KC |
| BUS000000 |
| 339.5094 |
| 330 |
| HB71-74 |
| QK 950 |
| Kurzbeschreibung |
A Political Economy Perspective on European Banking Regulation -- Varieties of Financial Systems and Regulatory Preferences -- Banking Regulation in an Integrating Financial Market -- Time Consistency Problems in the Interaction of Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy. |
| 2. Kurzbeschreibung |
Banking regulation is an economically powerful and politically very salient instrument of economic policy. After all, the financial crisis had derived from an over-leveraged banking system obviating the importance of banking regulation for the functioning of regulatory capitalism. Gundbert Scherf’s research focuses on this nexus between integrated banking, supranational monetary policy and national banking regulation. He finds that national level differences in financial systems and related institutions explain and drive variation in regulatory financial stability policy across countries. Applying game-theoretical rigor to political economy interactions, Gundbert Scherf develops a model of time-inconsistent supervisory policy as well as international competition in regulatory standards. He shows how these patterns lead to financial instability, by analyzing the original members of the Euro Zone as well as the US and the UK in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007/8. Contents · Varieties of financial systems and regulatory preferences · Banking regulation in an integrating financial market · Interaction of banking supervision and monetary policy · Time consistency problems in supervisory policy Target Groups · Researchers and students in the fields of economics, political economy, and finance interested in financial systems, regulation and supervisory policy · Central bankers, regulators, and executives in banking and finance The Author Dr. Gundbert Scherf wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein, Chair of Political Economy, at the Freie Universität Berlin. |
| 1. Schlagwortkette |
Europäische Union |
| Wirtschaftliche Stabilität |
| ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Europäische Union -- Wirtschaftliche Stabilität |
| 2. Schlagwortkette |
Europäische Union |
| Wirtschaftliche Stabilität |
| ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Europäische Union -- Wirtschaftliche Stabilität |
| SWB-Titel-Idn |
386841810 |
| Signatur |
Springer E-Book |
| Bemerkungen |
Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
| Elektronische Adresse |
$uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00983-0 |
| Internetseite / Link |
Volltext |
| Siehe auch |
Inhaltstext |
| Siehe auch |
Volltext |
| Siehe auch |
Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Siehe auch |
Cover |
