| Vorliegende Sprache |
eng |
| Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben |
354021443 Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Servatius, Philipp: Network economics and the allocation of savings |
| ISBN |
978-3-642-21095-2 |
| Name |
Servatius, Philipp |
| T I T E L |
Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings |
| Zusatz zum Titel |
A Model of Peering in the Voice-over-IP Telecommunications Market |
| Verlagsort |
Berlin, Heidelberg |
| Verlag |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| Erscheinungsjahr |
2012 |
| 2012 |
| Umfang |
Online-Ressource (XV, 297p. 48 illus, digital) |
| Reihe |
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 653 |
| Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems |
| Band |
653 |
| Notiz / Fußnoten |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-297) |
| Weiterer Inhalt |
Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings; Preface; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; Chapter 1: Motivation and Nontechnical Overview; Part I: Selected Theoretical Concepts; Chapter 2: The Theory of Games; 2.1 On Game Theory; 2.2 Noncooperative Games; 2.2.1 Overview; 2.2.2 Strategic Form Games; 2.2.3 Extensive Form Games; 2.3 Cooperative Games; 2.3.1 Overview; 2.3.2 The Cooperative Game; 2.3.3 Important Classes and Types of Games; 2.3.3.1 Strategic Equivalence; 2.3.3.2 The (0,1)-Normalization; 2.3.3.3 Constant-Sum and Zero-Sum Games. 2.3.3.4 Rational, Essential, and Inessential Games2.3.3.5 Dummy Players; 2.3.3.6 Carriers; 2.3.3.7 Unanimity Games; 2.3.3.8 Partnerships; 2.3.4 Properties of a Game; 2.3.4.1 Symmetry; 2.3.4.2 k-Games; 2.3.4.3 Supermodularity and Convexity; 2.3.4.4 How Supermodularity Implies Convexity and Vice Versa; 2.3.4.5 Superadditivity; 2.3.4.6 Monotonicity; 2.3.4.7 Decomposability; 2.3.5 Dual Games and the Tennessee Valley Authority; 2.3.5.1 Duality Applied: The Tennessee Valley Authority; 2.3.5.2 Relationship; 2.4 Solutions Concepts for Cooperative Games; 2.4.1 Overview. 2.4.2 Stable Sets: The von Neumann Morgenstern Solution2.4.3 The Core; 2.4.3.1 Overview; 2.4.3.2 Definition and Characterization of the Core; 2.4.3.3 The Existence of the Core; 2.4.3.4 Core Existence in 3-player Games; 2.4.3.5 Core Existence in n-player Games; 2.4.3.6 A Necessary Condition for General Games; 2.4.3.7 The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem; 2.4.3.8 The Core in Convex Games; 2.4.3.9 Stable Sets and the Core; 2.4.3.10 The Least-Core; 2.4.4 Allocation Rules as Point-valued Solutions; 2.4.5 The Shapley Value; 2.4.6 The Weighted Shapley Value; 2.4.7 Bargaining Solutions. 2.4.7.1 The Bargaining Problem2.4.7.2 The Nash Solution for Bargaining Problems; 2.4.7.3 The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution for Bargaining Problems; Chapter 3: Network Theory in Economics; 3.1 Overview; 3.2 Basic Concepts and Definitions; 3.3 Communication Situations; 3.4 Allocation Rules in Communication Situations; 3.5 The Myerson Value; 3.6 Network Formation; 3.6.1 Overview; 3.6.2 Network Formation in Extensive Form; 3.6.3 Network Formation in Strategic Form; 3.6.4 On the Stability of Networks; Part II: Applications to Peering in Telecommunications. Chapter 4: Telecommunications and the Internet4.1 Overview; 4.2 A Brief Refresher on Telecommunications Networks; 4.2.1 Architecture of a Classic PSTN; 4.2.2 The Internet; 4.2.3 Overlap and Convergence to Next Generation Networks; 4.3 Market Liberalization and Regulation; 4.4 Telephony on IP-Based Networks; 4.4.1 IP Telephony; 4.4.2 Classes of VoIP Firms; 4.4.3 The Re-Routing Problem; 4.5 Related Research; Chapter 5: A Model of Peering Among VoIP Firms; 5.1 Overview; 5.2 The VoIP Peering Game; 5.2.1 Basic Setup and Assumptions; 5.2.2 The Characteristic Function of the Game. 5.2.3 The Peering Game and Its Properties |
| Titelhinweis |
Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Servatius, Philipp: Network economics and the allocation of savings |
| ISBN |
ISBN 978-3-642-21096-9 |
| ISBN 1-283-44921-8 ebk |
| ISBN 978-1-283-44921-2 MyiLibrary |
| Klassifikation |
KCC |
| BUS044000 |
| 384.6015193 |
| 338.5 |
| 004.69/5 |
| 330 |
| HB172 |
| QR 700 |
| Kurzbeschreibung |
Motivation and Nontechnical Overview -- Selected Theoretical Concepts: The Theory of Games -- Network Theory in Economics. Applications to Peering in Telecommunications: Telecommunications and the Internet -- A Model of Peering Among VoIP Firms -- Network Formation in Peering -- Concluding Remarks -- Selected Mathematical Concepts |
| 2. Kurzbeschreibung |
This book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body |
| 1. Schlagwortkette |
Internettelefonie |
| Unternehmenskooperation |
| Netzwerkmanagement |
| Netzwerk <Graphentheorie> |
| Spieltheorie |
| 1. Schlagwortkette ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Internettelefonie -- Unternehmenskooperation -- Netzwerkmanagement -- Netzwerk -- Spieltheorie |
| 2. Schlagwortkette |
Internettelefonie |
| Unternehmenskooperation |
| Netzwerkmanagement |
| Netzwerk <Graphentheorie> |
| Spieltheorie |
| ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Internettelefonie -- Unternehmenskooperation -- Netzwerkmanagement -- Netzwerk -- Spieltheorie |
| SWB-Titel-Idn |
355111225 |
| Signatur |
Springer E-Book |
| Bemerkungen |
Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
| Elektronische Adresse |
$uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21096-9 |
| Internetseite / Link |
Volltext |
| Siehe auch |
Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Siehe auch |
Inhaltstext |
| Siehe auch |
Volltext |
| Siehe auch |
Cover |
