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Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information: Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time environment

Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information: Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time environment
Kataloginformation
Feldname Details
Vorliegende Sprache eng
Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben 348507062 Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Voigt, Guido, 1982 - : Supply chain coordination in case of asymmetric information
ISBN 978-3-642-20131-8
Name Voigt, Guido
T I T E L Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information
Zusatz zum Titel Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time environment
Verlagsort Berlin, Heidelberg
Verlag Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erscheinungsjahr 2011
2011
Umfang Online-Ressource (XXVII, 181p. 58 illus, digital)
Reihe Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 650
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems
Band 650
Notiz / Fußnoten Includes bibliographical references
Weiterer Inhalt CONTENTS; 1 Introduction; 2 Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information; 2.1 Contracting Under Asymmetric Information: BasicDefinitions, Assumptions and Concepts; 2.2 The Strategic Lotsizing Framework: Using Screening Contractsin Adverse Selection Models; 2.3 Benefits and Pitfalls of Information Sharing Under AsymmetricInformation; 2.4 Supply Chain Interactions Under Asymmetric Information:Literature Review; Appendix; 3 On the Impact of Fixed Cost Reduction in the Strategic LotsizingFramework; 3.1 Moving Towards Just-in-Time. 3.2 Fixed Cost Reduction in the Strategic Lotsizing Framework3.3 Overinvestment in Fixed Cost Reduction due to AsymmetricInformation; 3.4 Example: Convex Investment Function; 3.5 Conclusion and Managerial Insights; Appendix; 4 The Impact of Information Sharing on the Effectivenessof Screening Contracts: A First Laboratory Experiment; 4.1 Behavioral Studies in Supply Chain Coordinationwith Contracts; 4.2 Experimental Design and Implementation; 4.3 Do Suppliers React to the Shared Information?; 4.4 Are Buyers Screened Successfully?; 4.5 Is Information Sharing Cheap Talk?. 4.6 Does Information Sharing Enhance Supply Chain Performance?4.7 Conclusion and Managerial Insights; Appendix; 5 The Impact of Contract Complexity, Supply Chain Configuration,and Out-of-Equilibrium Behavior on the Effectivenessof Information Sharing: A Second Laboratory Experiment; 5.1 Experimental Design and Implementation; 5.2 Experimental Results; 5.3 Performance Impact; 5.4 Conclusion and Managerial Insights; Appendix: Sample Instruction (Translation into English); 6 A Behavioral Model on the Effects of Information Sharingon Supply Chain Performance; 6.1 Honesty in Principal-Agent Models. 6.2 The Impact of Communication, Trust, and Trustworthinesson Supply Chain Performance6.3 The Impact of Unconditioned Information Sharing; 6.4 Impact of Strategic Information Sharing; 6.5 Conclusion and Managerial Insights; Appendix: Proof of Theorems; 7 Conclusion and Outlook; 7.1 Different Kinds of Asymmetric Information and SupplyChain Interactions; 7.2 Signaling Contracts and Other Mechanisms; 7.3 Model Extensions; References
Titelhinweis Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Voigt, Guido, 1982 - : Supply chain coordination in case of asymmetric information
ISBN ISBN 978-3-642-20132-5
Klassifikation KJMV5
KJMV8
BUS087000
KJMV
658.5
HD28-70
QP 530
Kurzbeschreibung Introduction -- Supply chain coordination in case of asymmetric information -- On the impact of fixed cost reduction in the strategic lotsizing framework -- The impact of information sharing on the effectiveness of screening contracts: A first laboratory experiment -- The impact of contract complexity, supply chain configuration, and out-of-equilibrium behavior on the effectiveness of information sharing: A second laboratory experiment -- A behavioral model on the effects of information sharing on supply chain performance -- Conclusion and outlook
2. Kurzbeschreibung Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance
1. Schlagwortkette Supply Chain Management
Just-in-time-Produktion
Informationsaustausch
Asymmetrische Information
Agency-Theorie
1. Schlagwortkette ANZEIGE DER KETTE Supply Chain Management -- Just-in-time-Produktion -- Informationsaustausch -- Asymmetrische Information -- Agency-Theorie
2. Schlagwortkette Supply Chain Management
Just-in-time-Produktion
Informationsaustausch
Asymmetrische Information
Agency-Theorie
ANZEIGE DER KETTE Supply Chain Management -- Just-in-time-Produktion -- Informationsaustausch -- Asymmetrische Information -- Agency-Theorie
SWB-Titel-Idn 348699204
Signatur Springer E-Book
Bemerkungen Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz
Elektronische Adresse $uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20132-5
Internetseite / Link Volltext
Siehe auch Volltext
Siehe auch Cover
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