Vorliegende Sprache |
eng |
Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben |
346742749 Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Horniaček, Milan: Cooperation and efficiency in markets |
ISBN |
978-3-642-19762-8 |
Name |
Horniaček, Milan |
T I T E L |
Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets |
Verlagsort |
Berlin, Heidelberg |
Verlag |
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg |
Erscheinungsjahr |
2011 |
2011 |
Umfang |
Online-Ressource (VII, 92p, digital) |
Reihe |
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 649 |
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems |
Band |
649 |
Notiz / Fußnoten |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
Weiterer Inhalt |
Cooperation and Efficiencyin Markets; Preface; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 Choice of Solution Concepts; 1.2 Choice of Non-collusive Benchmarks; 1.3 Mathematical Notations; References; Chapter 2: Model; 2.1 Stage Game; 2.2 Repeated Game; 2.3 Solution Concepts; References; Chapter 3: Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE; 3.1 Existence of an SRPE; 3.2 Existence of an SSPE; Chapter 4: Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE; 4.1 Natural Oligopoly; 4.2 Natural Oligopsony; 4.3 Impact on Consumer Welfare. 4.3.1 Comparison with a Monopsonist Choosing the Traded Quantities on the Demand Side and Price Taking Behavior on the Supply Side of the Analyzed Market4.3.2 Comparison with Price Taking Behavior on the Demand Side and a Cournot Oligopoly on the Supply Side of the Analyzed Market; References; Chapter 5: Afterword; References; Index |
Titelhinweis |
Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Horniaček, Milan: Cooperation and efficiency in markets |
ISBN |
ISBN 978-3-642-19763-5 |
Klassifikation |
PBUD |
KCH |
BUS069000 |
MAT011000 |
KCA |
BUS069030 |
*91-02 |
91A20 |
91A80 |
91B26 |
91B54 |
330.0151 |
330 |
330.1 |
338.6/048 |
HB144 |
QH 430 |
QP 450 |
Kurzbeschreibung |
Introduction -- Model -- Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Afterword |
2. Kurzbeschreibung |
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare |
1. Schlagwortkette |
Oligopol |
Abgestimmtes Verhalten |
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung |
Wohlfahrtseffekt |
Spieltheorie |
1. Schlagwortkette ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Oligopol -- Abgestimmtes Verhalten -- Wettbewerbsbeschränkung -- Wohlfahrtseffekt -- Spieltheorie |
2. Schlagwortkette |
Oligopol |
Abgestimmtes Verhalten |
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung |
Wohlfahrtseffekt |
Spieltheorie |
ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Oligopol -- Abgestimmtes Verhalten -- Wettbewerbsbeschränkung -- Wohlfahrtseffekt -- Spieltheorie |
SWB-Titel-Idn |
347114369 |
Signatur |
Springer E-Book |
Bemerkungen |
Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
Elektronische Adresse |
$uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5 |
Internetseite / Link |
Volltext |
Siehe auch |
Volltext |
Siehe auch |
Cover |
Siehe auch |
Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Siehe auch |
Einführung/Vorwort |
Siehe auch |
Inhaltstext |