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Handbook on Approval Voting

Handbook on Approval Voting
Kataloginformation
Feldname Details
Vorliegende Sprache eng
Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben 330123645 Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Handbook on approval voting
ISBN 978-3-642-02838-0
Name Laslier, Jean-François
Sanver, M. Remzi
Name ANZEIGE DER KETTE Sanver, M. Remzi
T I T E L Handbook on Approval Voting
Verlagsort Berlin, Heidelberg
Verlag Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Erscheinungsjahr 2010
2010
Umfang Online-Ressource (XVIII, 480p. 49 illus, digital)
Reihe Studies in Choice and Welfare
Notiz / Fußnoten Literaturangaben
Weiterer Inhalt Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; Handbook on Approval Voting; 1 Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting; References; Part I History of Approval Voting; 2 Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting; 3 Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting; Part II Axiomatic Theory; 4 Collective Choice for Simple Preferences; 5 Axiomatizations of Approval Voting; Part III Committees; 6 Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections; 7 Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate's Will?; Part IV Strategic Voting. 8 The Basic Approval Voting Game9 Approval Voting in Large Electorates; 10 Computational Aspects of Approval Voting; Part V Probabilistic Exercises; 11 On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives; 12 Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approvaland Plurality Voting; 13 In Silico Voting Experiments; Part VI Experiments; 14 Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting; 15 Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections; 16 Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment. Part VII Electoral Competition17 Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting; 18 Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections; Part VIII Meaning for Individual and Society; 19 Describing Society Through Approval Data; 20 Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
Titelhinweis Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Handbook on approval voting
ISBN ISBN 978-3-642-02839-7
Klassifikation KCA
BUS069030
*91-06
91-00
91B12
91A80
00B15
330.1
324.63
324.6/3
HB1-846.8
SK 990
Kurzbeschreibung to the Handbook on Approval Voting -- History of Approval Voting -- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting -- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting -- Axiomatic Theory -- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences -- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting -- Committees -- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections -- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? -- Strategic Voting -- The Basic Approval Voting Game -- Approval Voting in Large Electorates -- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting -- Probabilistic Exercises -- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives -- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting -- In Silico Voting Experiments -- Experiments -- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting -- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections -- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment -- Electoral Competition -- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting -- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections -- Meaning for Individual and Society -- Describing Society Through Approval Data -- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
2. Kurzbeschreibung Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved
1. Schlagwortkette Approval voting
Wahlverhalten
Kollektiventscheidung
Aufsatzsammlung
1. Schlagwortkette ANZEIGE DER KETTE Approval voting -- Wahlverhalten -- Kollektiventscheidung -- Aufsatzsammlung
2. Schlagwortkette Approval voting
Wahlverhalten
Kollektiventscheidung
ANZEIGE DER KETTE Approval voting -- Wahlverhalten -- Kollektiventscheidung
SWB-Titel-Idn 327011688
Signatur Springer E-Book
Bemerkungen Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz
Elektronische Adresse $uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7
Internetseite / Link Volltext
Siehe auch Inhaltsverzeichnis
Siehe auch Inhaltstext
Siehe auch Volltext
Siehe auch Cover
Siehe auch Inhaltstext
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