Vorliegende Sprache |
eng |
Hinweise auf parallele Ausgaben |
313175233 Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Maaser, Nicola, 1981 - : Decision-making in committees |
ISBN |
978-3-642-04152-5 |
Name |
Maaser, Nicola |
T I T E L |
Decision-Making in Committees |
Zusatz zum Titel |
Game-Theoretic Analysis |
Verlagsort |
Berlin, Heidelberg |
Verlag |
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg |
Erscheinungsjahr |
2010 |
2010 |
Umfang |
Online-Ressource (XXII, 126p, digital) |
Reihe |
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 635 |
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems |
Band |
635 |
Notiz / Fußnoten |
Literaturverz. S. 119 - 126 |
Weiterer Inhalt |
Decision-Making in Committees; 1 Games and Political Decisions; 1.1 Basic Concepts; 1.2 Voting Rules and Power; 1.3 Voting Rules and Payoffs; 2 Committees as Representative Institutions; 2.1 Criteria for Representative Committees; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 Analytic Arguments; 2.4 Simulation Results; 2.5 Discussion; 3 Robust Equal Representation; 3.1 Simple and Sophisticated Square Root Rules; 3.2 Quota Variation; 3.3 Heterogeneity Across Constituencies; 3.4 Discussion; 4 Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation; 4.1 Motivation; 4.2 The Model; 4.3 Analysis of the Model; 4.4 Discussion; References |
Titelhinweis |
Buchausg. u.d.T.: ‡Maaser, Nicola, 1981 - : Decision-making in committees |
ISBN |
ISBN 978-3-642-04153-2 |
Klassifikation |
KCH |
BUS069000 |
PBUD |
MAT011000 |
*91-02 |
91A80 |
91F10 |
91B12 |
330.0151 |
330 |
519.3 |
320.6 |
HB144 |
QH 435 |
Kurzbeschreibung |
Games and Political Decisions -- Committees as Representative Institutions -- Robust Equal Representation -- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation |
2. Kurzbeschreibung |
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions |
1. Schlagwortkette |
Ausschuss |
Entscheidungsfindung |
Kooperatives Spiel |
Nichtkooperatives Spiel |
1. Schlagwortkette ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Ausschuss -- Entscheidungsfindung -- Kooperatives Spiel -- Nichtkooperatives Spiel |
2. Schlagwortkette |
Ausschuss |
Entscheidungsfindung |
Kooperatives Spiel |
Nichtkooperatives Spiel |
ANZEIGE DER KETTE |
Ausschuss -- Entscheidungsfindung -- Kooperatives Spiel -- Nichtkooperatives Spiel |
SWB-Titel-Idn |
318560062 |
Signatur |
Springer E-Book |
Bemerkungen |
Elektronischer Volltext - Campuslizenz |
Elektronische Adresse |
$uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04153-2 |
Internetseite / Link |
Volltext |
Siehe auch |
Volltext |
Siehe auch |
Cover |
Siehe auch |
Inhaltstext |